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Abstract The Fukushima nuclear catastrophe has led to a wide-spread international discus-
sion on how seismic and tsunami hazards can be better predicted and adverse consequences be
prevented. In some countries the event led to the complete phase-out of nuclear energy. The
lessons drawn by different organisations including earth scientists, earthquake engineers,
non-governmental and governmental organisations will be reviewed from an independent
position. This review captures the following areas: (1) Hazard assessment, (2) Engineering
design and defence in depth concepts, (3) Emergency preparedness. It is shown that not all
important lessons from the catastrophe have been drawn, because some of the root causes of
the accident are not yet addressed. Especially the need of a holistic approach towards hazard
assessment and the implementation of defence in depth and diversity of design principles for
critical infrastructures like nuclear power plants hast to be stronger emphasized to prevent
similar disasters.
Keywords Disaster prevention · Seismic hazard analysis · Tsunami hazard analysis
1 Introduction
The nuclear catastrophe of Fukushima triggered an intense discussion about the safety of
nuclear power plants. As an immediate consequence many countries requested to perform
safety and security stress tests. In addition or as a consequence of stress test results the
implementation of urgent measures to improve nuclear power plant safety were requested
by regulatory agencies. Actions taken were frequently copied from one country to the other
a not unusual activism observed after big accidents to quieten public opinion. The sequence
of events has been analysed in detail both by expert organisations (GRS 2013) as well as by
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Fig. 1 Fukushima nuclear power plant site (Tokyo electric power company)
critical non-governmental organisations (Lochbaum et al. 2013). Nevertheless a systematic
and in depth analysis of the root causes of the accident is not easily be found. Without such
a root cause analysis it is difficult to judge whether the actions taken or planned will really
prevent similar catastrophes in the future.
This paper is attempting to provide this missing root cause analysis by separating impor-
tant causes from contributing factors that had some but not decisive effect on the final con-
sequences of the Fukushima accident. Based on the root cause analysis an evaluation is
performed whether the actions taken by different national and international organisations
are satisfactory to prevent future nuclear disasters or what additional actions may have to be
required.
2 Summary of the Fukushima accident sequence
The sequence of events leading to the nuclear catastrophe of Fukushima is described in
detail in (GRS 2013) or similar reports issued by different organisations (IAEA 2011; INPO
2011). Here we provide a short summary about the key events leading to the core damage
in 3 nuclear reactors. Figure 1 shows the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant site before the
accident. Figure 2 shows the allocation of buildings at the site area.
The accident was triggered by the big Tohoku-Oki earthquake at 14:46 local time on March,
11, 2011. This subduction earthquake with a moment magnitude Mw of 9.0 is assessed as of
being the largest earthquake observed in historical time in Japan. The earthquake hypocentre
was located at a depth of 30 km below sea ground approximately 130 km east of Sendai.
The earthquake led to a large horizontal displacement of 15 m and a vertical displacement
of about 9 m at sea ground level.
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Fig. 2 Fukushima nuclear power plant site—allocation of buildings (INPO 2011)
The earthquake caused all of the operating units (units 1, 2, and 3) at the Fukushima site
to automatically scram on seismic reactor protection system trips. It is worth to mention that
only few nuclear power plants in the World (Japanese, Russian, and Bulgarian) possess such
seismic shutdown systems. The earthquake damaged breakers and distribution towers, caus-
ing a loss of all off-site electrical power sources to the site. The emergency diesel generators
(2 per unit) automatically started and provided AC power to emergency systems. At this point
of time all plants were in a safe transition state to cold shutdown.
At 14:49 a first tsunami alert was issued. The predicted expected height was 3 m that is
below the tsunami design of the Fukushima nuclear power plants. Forty-one minutes after the
earthquake, at 15:27, the first of a series of seven tsunamis arrived at the site. The maximum
tsunami height impacting the site was estimated to be 14–15 m. This exceeded the design
basis tsunami height of 5.7 m and was above the site grade levels of 10 m at units 1–4 (Fig. 3).
As a consequence of the arrival of the tsunami waves all water intakes of units 1–4 failed
and at 15:51 the diesel generators of the units failed. Thus the AC power supply completely
failed. A total station blackout (loss of all AC power supplies) occurred. Additionally the
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Fig. 3 Inundation levels after arrival of tsunami waves (height 14 m) (in blue the tsunami water level)
batteries at unit 1 failed because the battery room was flooded. The present generation of
nuclear power plants are not designed to withstand a long term total station blackout. Such
extreme beyond design basis accidents are coped with by prepared accident management
actions requesting manual interference of plant operators. If these actions are performed
successfully the consequences of a long term station blackout can be mitigated. It is important
to note that accident management actions carried out at the plant site always require external
support (human resources, technical means, and specialized equipment) at the long term.
Due to the tremendous damage caused by the earthquake and the tsunami failing the regional
infrastructure more or less completely and killing many people such external support was
not available despite the fact that the plant staff was able to delay the core damage for units
3 and especially unit 2 substantially. Nevertheless the core damage could not be prevented.
Despite that many details of the accident progression are not yet fully clarified it has to be
concluded that core damage at unit 1 started around 4–5 h after the earthquake. In unit 2 the
core damage most likely occurred during the evening hours of March 14, 2011, while in unit
3 the core damage started most likely in the morning hours of March 14, 2014 (GRS 2013).
Without external support the subsequent consequences including radiological releases could
not be prevented.
3 Direct and root causes of the accident
For learning lessons from a nuclear disaster it is important to understand the key direct
and especially the key root causes of the accident. The first reflective actions taken after
the accident in many countries were related to an improvement of accident management.
These actions were taken even without detailed analysis. It can be concluded that the main
cause for the accident was considered to be an insufficiently prepared accident management.
A closer look shows that this is not true. The main reason is that a long term accident
management is only possible if at least a long term external support is possible. In case of
such an extreme hazard like in Fukushima which is affecting a whole region this is unlikely
to be expected. Some operators of nuclear power plants argued (as it is frequently done on
such occasions) that such an event cannot happen here (“Not here”, see for example for the
U.S. the discussion in Lochbaum et al. (2013). This argument may be valid with respect to
the very specific combinations of hazards affecting Fukushima. It is generally not true with
regard to the possible occurrence of extreme events of natural origin that may affect the plant.
Therefore, a deeper look at the root causes is required.
The following areas have to be considered:
(1) Hazard analysis
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(2) Engineering design and good practices
(3) Emergency preparedness
3.1 Hazard analysis
The tsunami design levels were based on the observation of tsunami heights after the Great
Chile Earthquake of 1960. Therefore the original tsunami design of the plant considered a
wave height of about 3.1–3.7 m. An evaluation performed in 2002 ended up with a revised
hazard estimate of 5.1–5.2 m still within the scope of safety provisions of the plant. This was
confirmed by a detailed probabilistic tsunami study performed by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric
Power Company) using expert judgement and the very popular in probabilistic hazard analysis
logic tree approach to estimate the tsunami hazard triggered by a large subduction earthquake
as it is characteristic for the Sendai coast of Japan (Annaka et al. 2007). The evaluation of the
study results was based on the mean value (Annaka et al. 2007) estimated over a prediction
time period of 30 years. The same study indicated the possibility of higher inundation levels
that corresponded to the upper tail fractiles of the uncertainty distribution. These possible
insights were ignored because the mean value of the logic was used as the decision criterion.
The hazard assessment ignored to a large extent the observed historical experience of the
region north of Fukushima. For instance the big Sanriku tsunami of 1896 was caused by an
earthquake of magnitude 7.2 caused much higher inundation levels and the tsunami following
the Jagun earthquake of 869 that struck the Sanriku area led to observable remnants far inland
of the Fukushima coats region.
3.2 Engineering design and good practices
Even given the underestimation of the seismic and tsunami hazard the consequences of the
March 11, 2011 events could have been mitigated if the plant design would have followed the
generally accepted approaches of ensuring nuclear safety. The main approach for ensuring
nuclear safety is the application of the “defence in depth” concept. This concept requires
the implementation of several levels of defence and multiple barriers to prevent accidents
or to mitigate their consequences preventing releases of radioactivity. According to INSAG
(International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group)10 (International Nuclear Safety Advisory
Group 1996) defence in depth has the following objectives (quotation):
• “to compensate for potential human and component failures;
• to maintain the effectiveness of the barriers by averting damage to the plant and to the
barriers themselves; and
• to protect the public and the environment from harm in the event that these barriers are
not fully effective.”
To ensure a sufficient level of reliability of the technical means applied to achieve these
objectives the principles of redundancy, functional independency (physical separation of
redundancies) and diversity are applied. The principle of redundancy requires a design of the
safety systems with abundant capacity provided by several channels of safety. Most typically
an independent single failure is considered, requiring a N+1 – design (N channels required
for complying with the required functions +1 coping with an independent from the initiating
event single failure) of systems. Meanwhile it is good practice to provide a N+2 design for
safety systems taking into account an additional unavailability that may have been caused by
maintenance work. What frequently is overlooked is that these principles have to be applied
not only for the front line systems performing required safety functions but also for support
functions ensuring the operability of the frontline systems.
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The functional independency (physical separation) shall provide some defence against
events that may affect common elements of the functional chains of safety systems. At the
same time it provides protection against so-called area events. These are events that may
destroy equipment in a localized area. In case of a tsunami such a localized area is the near
coast part of the site which is vulnerable to flood waves. Physical separation ensures that such
area events cannot fail equipment belonging to different redundancies of the safety system.
The principle of diversity requires that safety functions serving the same purpose (e.g.
injecting water into the reactor) are performed by systems following physically different
operational principles. For example safety injection provided by a pump could be comple-
mented by safety injection from a pressurized tank (accumulator) injection water once the
pressure in the reactor drops below the pressure in the tank not requiring electrical power for
its operation.
These principles were not complied with in the design of the Fukushima Daichii Nuclear
Power Plant. The principle of physical separation would have required a spatial separation
of the two existing diesel generators located in the turbine building below the inundation
level of tsunami floods. The allocation of one of the diesel generators away from the coast
for example behind the reactor building and the availability of a raised cooling water pool
or well providing emergency cooling for essential safety systems most likely would have
been sufficient to prevent the catastrophic consequences of the tsunami waves attacking the
reactor units. Modern designs require at least an independent second main water intake and
a second heat sink to ensure heat removal after a reactor shutdown. This was not fulfilled
for the Fukushima plant. The loss of the main water intakeas the result of the impact of the
tsunami limited the chances of an early recovery of the accident situation.
3.3 Emergency preparedness
The Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was reasonably well prepared for an emergency situa-
tion. The plant possessed a dedicated emergency centre that was designed against large seis-
mic loads and provided radiological sheltering for emergency staff. Before the Fukushima
accident very few nuclear power plants had a similar facility. Additionally, the Japanese
nuclear power plants have a dedicated trained emergency team although of limited staffing
on the site. During the accident the staff in general did the best that could have been expected
given such an extreme external event. In the aftermath (the usual hindsight) some deficiencies
were discovered that affected the efficacy of accident management actions. The most impor-
tant was the dependency of accident management actions on DC power (from batteries).
Battery power was required to keep valves in the injection connections provided for accident
management to the feedwater system open. Battery capacity in general is limited. Usually
it lasts for not more than 10 h without charging. Significant time delays occurred because
of interactions between security requirements and safety needs. Security doors under loss
of offsite power conditions locked completely thus preventing or delaying access to some
service areas.
It is also frequently stated that there was some lack of written guidance how to imple-
ment severe accident management actions, but the key problem while implementing accident
management actions was the lack of external support. The accident sequence in unit 1 was
too fast anyway, to implement counter measures but with more efficient external support a
significantly better chance to mitigate the consequences of the accidents at unit 3 and 2 can
reasonably be expected. Therefore the root cause for the problems encountered in the area
of emergency preparedness was (is!) the widespread false belief that with a sufficient time
window available efficient external support would be available in time to prevent the worst.
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4 Actions taken by international organisations after the Fukushima accident
After the Fukushima accident many activities were launched by different international organ-
isations (IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), ENSREG (European Nuclear Safety
Regulators), WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulatory Agencies), and WANO (World
Association of Nuclear Operators)) and national regulatory agencies. The activities can be
subdivided into
(1) Complementary safety assessment
(2) Short term actions
(3) Long term actions
The complementary safety assessment included different types of national and international
stress tests (e.g. European stress test) focussed on specific design issues like the protection
against external events and on emergency preparedness including severe accident scenarios.
The plant-specific assessments were performed mainly on deterministic grounds, while the
hazard estimates were frequently based on probabilistic methods despite the obvious flaws
of the method leading to the biased hazard estimates of TEPCO accepted by the Japanese
regulator NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency). Insights from PSA studies (Proba-
bilistic Safety Analysis) were considered in a more qualitative sense. The low risk numbers
frequently reported especially for natural hazards like earthquakes and floods including dam
breaks were questioned seriously in view of the Fukushima events with the exception of the
U.S.A. (Lochbaum et al. 2013).
Short term actions were mainly aimed at improvements of accident management and
emergency response procedures. WANO suggested and endorsed the implementation of the
so-called FLEX (shortcut for “diverse and flexible mitigation capability”) strategy worldwide
like it was implemented by the nuclear industry (INPO) in the U.S.A. This strategy includes
the foundation of well-equipped local and/or regional emergency centres. In few countries
it includes special dedicated emergency teams. Similar approaches were implemented in
Russia, France and in a more limited scope in Switzerland. The implementation of this strategy
included minor plant modifications like the installation of additional injection nozzles with
flexible connections for fire extinguishing water hoses, the purchase and storage of additional
diesel fuel reserves and the onsite storage of additional mobile pumps. These short-term
actions certainly improved the NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) capacity to execute mitigating
accident management actions in case of a severe accident but they do not contribute to accident
prevention.
Mid- und long term actions include the implementation of bunkered station blackout
systems (e.g. Japan) or additional secured diesel generator buildings (planned in France),
filtered containment venting systems and passive autocatalytic recombiners. While the later
measures serve also the purpose of severe accident management the first and more expansive
measures represent a design basis extension that leads to a significant reduction of risk. Only
very few plants have decided to go in this direction and plan to extend their original design
basis to cope with previously not considered extreme external events. The reason why the
number of plants is limited is because of the problems associated with the amortization of
the costs. This is difficult even in case of lifetime extension.
Some countries preferred to move to a direct phase-out of nuclear energy (Germany and
Belgium, and Switzerland at least on the long term) because other competitive sources of
electricity appeared to be available in Europe.
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5 Lessons not yet learned from Fukushima
Reviewing the actions taken by the international nuclear community it has to be concluded that
only a minor part of the root causes of the Fukushima disaster is addressed. The main focus is
on emergency preparedness, the least important contributor to the disaster. The most important
root cause—the underestimation of the seismic and tsunami hazard—is not addressed at all.
Despite the very poor hazard prediction results of traditional PSHA (Probabilistic Seismic
Hazard Analysis), – nearly all recent large earthquakes (Tohoku earthquake and tsunami,
Haiti (2010), Sichuan (2008), L’Aquila (2009) were underestimated in PSHA maps) the
method is still in use and widely endorsed internationally although their systematic errors are
very well-known as for instance is outlined in Klügel (2007, 2008, 2011). If this important
lesson is not learned catastrophes like in Fukushima may repeat. They also may affect other
safety critical industries. There are still many nuclear power plants located in active seismic
regions. Their seismic or tsunami design basis was obtained from probabilistic hazard studies.
Most likely the design of these plants is based on biased assessments. So what is wrong
with the NUREG/CR-6372 method of PSHA (Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee
(SSHAC) 1997) originally developed by Cornell (1968)
Here I will discuss only the most important topics:
(1) The Poisson assumption and the lognormallity of site specific ground motions
(2) The false belief in “return periods”
(3) The use of logic trees and the aggregation of expert opinions
(4) The inadequacy of PSHA results for engineering damage prediction
5.1 The Poisson assumption and the lognormallity of site specific ground motions
The assumptions that earthquake recurrence mathematically follows a Homogeneous Poisson
Process (HPP) and the assumption that the distribution of ground motion (spectral accelera-
tion) follows a lognormal distribution provide the hard core basis of standard PSHA (Cornell
1968; Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) 1997). On the first look there
seems to be some basis for this assumption looking at observational data. Statistical tests
can be provided to support these assumptions. For earthquake recurrence it may require the
elimination of some “disturbing” information by using a declustering technique.
The model of a Homogeneous Poisson Process is wrong for a very obvious reason and this
reason has nothing to do with statistics but with elementary seismology and fault mechanics.
A homogeneous Poisson Process is a memory less process. That means that the occurrence
of an earthquake is not dependent on the occurrence of previous earthquakes. The probability
that an earthquake will occur is constant for each point in space and independent of time. This
property of lack of memory less of the HPP contradicts to the theory “seismic cycle” that is
based on the simple physical law that a fault system that has released its energy has to rebuild
strain and stress conditions that are able to trigger the next event. This process needs time.
Therefore, the process of earthquake recurrence for a given point of space is time dependent.
On the other hand each earthquake causes physical destruction of the geological formation
(part of the fault) forming the conditions for its occurrence. These effects may be different
in scale for small and for large earthquakes but they exist for both types of earthquakes. This
simply means that a complete mathematical description of earthquake recurrence needs a
joint, multivariate model depending on space and time:
f (E) = g
(
t, X
)
(5.1)
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Here E represents the event (occurrence of an earthquake), t is time and X is the location
vector of the point of interest in a corresponding system of coordinates.
This characteristic behaviour is even acknowledged by proponents of PSHA like the late
(Bolt 2004) who described the recurrence behaviour of earthquakes as a combination of
a self-exciting and of a self-correction behaviour. The self- exciting behaviour describes
the instance that an earthquake occurring at point (x, t1) in space and time increases the
likelihood of an earthquake occurring at point (y, t2) in space and time, where t1 is less than
t2. Self-correcting behaviour characterizes the circumstance that the conditional rate of an
earthquake at (y, t2) depends on the strain present at point y and time t2. As the occurrence
of an earthquake at a nearby point x at a previous time t1 decreases the strain at point y, such
an event will generally decrease the conditional rate at (y, t2). This description clearly leads
to a model like described by Eq. (5.1) and it is obvious that this is not a recurrence model of
a Homogeneous Poisson Process.
What is the reason why statistical tests (at least after declustering) frequently seem to prove
the compliance with a Homogeneous Poisson Process? It is a simple statistical trick. It is
well known that due to theorem of the Russian mathematician Khinchine the superposition of
stochastic processes (independent from their true characteristics) asymptotically converges to
a Poisson process if none of the underlying processes is dominating. This “non-dominance”
property of data can be achieved by a process called data pooling. Data pooling (or the use of
insufficiently classified data) is one of the statistical tricks that is frequently applied to hide
functional dependencies in observational data. With regard to our problem data pooling is
achieved by ignoring the dependence of earthquake frequency on spatial variables in Eq. (5.1).
Hence the pooling is performed over space. PSHA recurrence models pool recurrence data
from regions with low seismicity together with regions (e.g. faults) which are seismically
active. As long as the area (zone in a zonation model) from where data is collected is large
enough the preconditions of the theorem of Khinchine remain to be valid. Effectively active
seismological nodes like active faults obtain a low weight in this pooling process due to their
small dimensions or due to the large recurrence period of earthquakes at these faults extending
beyond the range of the observation period. This process pooling process works also on large
faults consisting of many segments. Individual earthquakes most frequently lead to a rupture
of only a part of a fault or fault segment. Such active parts (segments) are pooled together with
not active parts. Again the pooling assured that the theorem of Khinchine holds. Therefore we
have to conclude that the results of statistical tests are intentionally or unintentionally made
up. Anyway standard statistical tests do not prove anything. A positive results simply says
that it cannot be excluded that the data analysed comes from a specific type of distribution.
Further analysis shall be performed to check whether the selected distribution or the selected
model has any physical meaning. The Poisson assumption obviously does not have such a
physical meaning. The conclusion is that a Poisson model of earthquake recurrence developed
on pooled data cannot be used for the prediction of future hazards for any type of local critical
infrastructure because this model contradicts to the physics of earthquake recurrence.
The situation is very similar with regard to the assumption of the lognormal character of
ground motions expressed by the following standard form of an Empirical Ground Motion
Prediction Equation (GMPE):
log (Sa) = h (m, r, Xother ) + εσlog (5.2)
Here Sa is spectral acceleration, m is magnitude (in whatever scale), r is distance (in whatever
scale) Xother are other explanatory variables used in the model h describing the regression
mean (Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) 1997) for the data used in its
development; σlog is the standard deviation in log scale and ε is the normalized standard
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error obtained under the assumption that the residuals in Eq. (5.2) are normally distributed:
E = εσlog ∼ N
(
0, σlog
)
. In PSHA (Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC)
1997) the term E is usually interpreted as aleatory variability. Again the lognormallity is
frequently approved by statistical testing. Again this is the result of data pooling. The seem-
ingly lognormal behaviour is the result of the Central Limit Theorem applied in log space.
This time the pooling is performed by lumping earthquake recordings (e.g. acceleration time
histories) from different areas of the world into a common database and fitting a regression
equation based on this data. Of course different shapes of such equations can be suggested
and this type of modelling uncertainty is then classified as epistemic (lack of knowledge)
uncertainty.
Another problem is that Eq. (5.2) assumes axisymmetric wave propagation. This assump-
tion is only approximately valid for the far field solution of the wave propagation equation
while the results of PSHA for critical infrastructures typically indicate that the probabilistic
seismic hazard is governed by near field sources. Therefore the results of PSHA are in con-
tradiction to the preconditions required to make the PSHA seismic wave attenuation model
at least asymptotically applicable.
The next question is whether the results of a PSHA have any meaning for practical risk
assessment of a critical infrastructure. Here we are looking only on the formal mathematical
part of the question. The standard PSHA model for hazard integration over all possible seismic
sources looks like the following equation generalized from (Reiter 1990):
E (a) =
N∑
i=1
νi
mu∫
m0
∞∫
r=0
fi (m) f (r |m )i Pi (Sa > a |m, r ) drdm (5.3)
Here E (a) is the expected number of exceedances (the mean annual rate of exceedances,
the annual frequency of exceedance) of ground motion level a during time t (1 year for
the annual rate), νi is the mean rate of occurrence of earthquakes between lower and upper
magnitude bounds (m0 and mu) being considered for the i-th source, fi (m) is the probability
density distribution of magnitude (recurrence relationship) within source i, f (r |m )i is the
conditional probability density distribution of epicentral (or source) distance between various
locations within source i and the site (reference point) for which the hazard is being estimated
and Pi (Sa > a |m, r ) is the conditional probability that a given earthquake of magnitude m
and distance r to a point in source i will exceed ground motion level a. This probability is
typically computed using an Empirical Ground Motion Prediction Equation:
Pi (Sa > a |m, r ) = ′
(
log (Sa) − hi (m, r)
σlog,i
)
(5.4)
Here it is assumed that a separate GMPE is available for each of the sources. That would
be the best way of performing a PSHA study allowing to consider directly source and path
dependencies, but most frequently just a single equation is used for all the sources and
different alternatives are investigated using a logic tree approach.
The point to be emphasized here is that the location of the site of the critical infrastructure
is assumed to be a point. The problem is that the hazard assessed based on this assumption is
significantly underestimating the risk for the critical infrastructure. A typical nuclear power
plant (single unit) has an area of between 50,000 and 100,000 m2. This can hardly be approx-
imated as a point. Of course the acceleration levels will differ over such an area (e.g. seismic
wave incoherency, different local soil properties) but it is unlikely that the acceleration levels
will differ by so much that they do not impose any risk for plant equipment. The key point
is that the frequency of exceedance is computed wrongly because it would be necessary to
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perform the evaluation of the frequency over the whole area of the plant (over a large amount
of points) not just for a reference point.
The events of Fukushima indicated an even larger problem. The Fukushima site was not the
site most affected by the Tohoku-Oki earthquake. Significantly higher intensity levels were
observed outside of Fukushima NPP. Nevertheless, the damage caused by the earthquake
in other places heavily affected the safety of the Fukushima NPPs. This external to the site
damage caused the loss of offsite power (unavailability of the electrical grid) as well as of the
long term inaccessibility of the plant for external support forces. It also bound resources of
the Japanese Self Defence Forces so that they could not support the plant staff in mitigating
the consequences of the accident (Lochbaum et al. 2013).
In summary it can be concluded that the key assumptions used in PASHA (Senior Seismic
Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) 1997) are incorrect. The results obtained by PSHA
are insufficient to address the full scale of possible damaging effects influencing the safety of
a critical infrastructure like a nuclear power plant. Such damaging effects may occur much
more likely than calculated by PSHA especially in high seismic regions like California (e.g.
for the NPP Diablo Canyon) and Japan.
5.2 The false belief in “return periods”
Based on the Poisson assumption it is common to define a “return period” for an earthquake
corresponding to a specific acceleration level. Many national seismic civil engineering codes
are based on this terminology. The derivation of “return period” is based on the assumption
that the frequency of occurrence of an earthquake is constant with time. Under the Poisson
assumption the probability that an earthquake exceeding acceleration level a will occur within
time period t is:
p = 1 − exp (−E (a) t) (5.5)
According to terminology the return period T is defined as the reciprocal value of the fre-
quency of an earthquake exceeding acceleration level a:
T = 1
E (a)
(5.6)
For t = 1 year and E (a)  1 we can develop the right term of Eq. (5.5) into a series
disregarding the higher terms and obtain:
p ≈ E (a) t = E (a) × 1 year = 1
T
× 1 year (5.7)
Therefore, numerically the “return period” is the reciprocal value of the probability that an
earthquake exceeding acceleration level a will occur within one year. It is obvious that this
derivation of the “return period” is valid only under the Poisson assumption. The danger of
the term “return period” is that people started to believe that a “return period” is a temporal
characteristic of earthquake recurrence. Therefore, people and especially engineers and reg-
ulatory decision makers started to believe that a “return period” of 10,000 years really means
that earthquakes exceeding an acceleration level corresponding to a will occur only once in
10,000 years.
This is not correct for manifold reasons.
First of all as shown before the Poisson assumption is physically not valid for earthquake
recurrence (Sect. 5.1). Secondly, the analysis of Eq. (5.3) shows that only the average rate of
events νi (number of earthquakes originated in source) above the minimal magnitude level
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taken into account) and the magnitude recurrence relationship are directly related to a fre-
quency). All other terms are spatial characteristics. Especially the probability of exceedance
calculated by Eq. (5.4) plays the role of a “spatial reduction factor”, because its values is ≤ 1.
Its calculation is based on empirical GMPE that are based on the assumption axisymmetric
wave propagation. Therefore, the number (frequency) of earthquakes that potentially endan-
ger the site of a critical infrastructure is much higher than the predicted mean value E (a).
Because each of these earthquakes affects a shaking area that is much larger than just a point
and because the assumption of axisymmetric wave propagation in general is not valid, it has
to be expected that for a significant number of points at distance r from the source of the
earthquake the frequency of exceeding a is significantly higher than the predicted mean value.
Statistically the fraction of this points could be assessed by using the higher fractiles of the
uncertainty distribution for the ground motion levels given by the GMPE (frequently called
the aleatory variability distribution) if the GMPE were verified and validated. This is very
important for probabilistic seismic hazard maps that are usually based on the median (then
in 50 % of all points located at distance r from the source a deviation from the prediction is
expected) or the mean value of the hazard. But here the next (third problem) arises. In regions
with lack of observational data empirical GMPEs are imported from other regions. In many
cases the GMPEs are derived from data collected in different regions (ergodic assumption –
observations in time at a single station (long term observation) are replaced by observations
at many stations (space, short term observations)) that are pooled together. Therefore, these
equations may not even reflect the true “spatial” behaviour of seismic wave propagation.
That introduces an additional source of error into the analysis.
Summarizing the discussion it has to be concluded that the term “return period” does not
represent a temporal characteristic of earthquake recurrence. It is a nice surrogate (many “real”
earthquakes are replace by the model of a single Poisson type earthquake) term invented for
illustration but completely without any temporal meaning. Dangerous earthquakes happen
much more frequently than predicted by these maps. It is very natural that probabilistic
seismic hazard maps are not able to predict future hazards and that empirical earthquake
observations show significant deviations from such maps.
5.3 The use of logic trees and the aggregation of expert opinions
The U.S NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) recognized the complexity of seismic haz-
ard assessment and most likely came to the conclusion that a realistic seismic hazard assess-
ment is not possible due to the manifold problems to be solved. Therefore, they came up with
the idea to develop a “scientific consensus” on the seismic hazard of critical infrastructures
and developed a formalised approach to utilize logic trees and expert judgement to obtain
consensus models that reflect the centre, the body and the range of opinion of the techni-
cal informed community with respect to the seismic hazard assessment of critical nuclear
infrastructures (Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) 1997). Therefore, the
main goal is to achieve a harmonized view on the seismic hazard to be considered and not to
obtain a realistic seismic hazard estimate. From the point of view of politics and democratic
formation of a societal opinion this approach may be regarded as reasonable. Unfortunately,
science is not following the rules of democracy and history of science has proven that the
scientific main stream was frequently wrong.
The key technique employed is the weighing of different modelling alternatives by the
use of logic trees. Models have to be developed or proposed by experts in a facilitated expert
judgement process. In this process the experts assess (weigh) the scientific validity of the
different models proposed by assigning weights (subjective probabilities) reflecting their
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degree of belief in the corresponding models. Different levels of expert judgement processes
are defined with level 4 being the highest level (Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee
(SSHAC) 1997; Ayyub and Klir 2006). In a level 4 process the experts have the right to
overrule observation and measurement data (Abrahamson et al. 2004) and they stay the
owners of their models. The later means that nobody has the right to correct their results.
Only earth scientists (with very limited knowledge of nuclear technology) are allowed to
participate in the assessment process.
In Klügel (2011) I provided a detailed review of the associated methods. It was clearly
demonstrated that the results of these methods are ambiguous. The formal mathematical
aggregation of expert opinions can be performed using different techniques e.g. equal weights
for each expert, performance based weights, Bayesian aggregation (geometric weights) etc.
It was shown that for the same seismological and geological input the results of hazard
integration will be very different in dependence on the mathematical aggregation method
used.
Therefore, the use of logic trees and of expert judgement does not help to obtain realistic
hazard assessments. Therefore, it also does not help to prevent the repetition of disasters
caused by extreme natural events as observed in Fukushima.
5.4 The inadequacy of PSHA results for engineering damage prediction
The main result of a PSHA is the so-called uniform hazard spectrum (UHS) of ground motion
acceleration (Abrahamson et al. 2004) although some alternatives based on the disaggregation
of the spectrum are applied in research applications. A UHS is compiled of computed spectral
acceleration levels that are believed to be exceeded with the same probability (or frequency).
This is the reason why the spectrum is called uniform.
There are quite a few problems associated with this approach. First of all the spectral form
is artificial and in many cases (except for the case of a single dominant source) its shape is
different from a response spectrum of a real earthquake. Because many engineering methods
(e.g. the so-called fragility method of EPRI (1994, 2002, 2009) – the fragility function
expresses the conditional probability of failure of a component for a given acceleration
response spectrum) are explicitly using the shape information to assess the limit capacity of
components of nuclear power plants an incorrect information on the spectral shape can lead
to an incorrect assessment of the fragilities of components.
Secondly, this approach implicitly assumes (this is expressed by the term uniform) that
the damaging impact of each of the contributing earthquakes (within the magnitude range
between m0 and mu) has the same damaging impact. This is only true for certain design
applications when a fully elastic response of a component during an earthquake is requested.
In this case a force-based (mass multiplied by acceleration) design guarantees a robust perfor-
mance. But a completely elastic response is not necessary for most of the structures, systems
and components of a nuclear power plant. On contrary some limited inelastic behaviour is
allowed from engineering and risk perspective and in many cases like for buildings it is
even sufficient that a building collapse can be prevented. Therefore, some limited damage
within required boundaries of functional performance is acceptable. Under these conditions
a force-based design does not make sense. This is obvious from elementary school physics.
For damaging something you have to perform work! And for performing work you have
submit energy to the structure, system or component. The only sources of energy are the
seismic input energy of the seismic waves arriving at the site and the potential energy of
structure submitted to the seismic wave field. Acceleration level and spectral shape of the
response spectrum define the amount of energy transferred to the structure. The seismic
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input energy defines the duration of the interaction length of hysteretic cycling of the struc-
ture, system or component. Therefore, for engineering and realistic risk applications (risk
is dealing with damage) one needs the joint information of response spectrum, acceleration
level and the earthquake strong motion duration. This joint information includes the correla-
tion between these physical characteristics of an earthquake. High frequency accelerations
caused by small near site earthquakes are completely unimportant under this perspective, but
such earthquakes are just representing the dominant contributors to the results of a PSHA
(Abrahamson et al. 2004). This can easily be confirmed by converting the deaggregation
results of a PSHA into site intensities (or intensity factors in engineering terms) (Klügel
2009). Small near-site earthquakes may cause high accelerations but the intensities associ-
ated with such earthquakes are small or moderate (typically Intensity ≤ 7 in EMS scale).
Seismologists may not know this but such low intensity events do not provide a challenge
to the robust design of modern nuclear power plants. Again, a PSHA possibly underesti-
mates the seismic hazard because of the overestimation of the importance of small near site
earthquakes.
6 Summary and conclusions
A detailed analysis of the root causes of the nuclear disaster at Fukushima and the actions
taken by international and national organisations reveals that the key root causes are not
yet addressed. This is especially true with respect to the hazard analysis for extreme natural
events. It is still insufficiently understood that traditional probabilistic models based on the
Poisson assumption are inadequate to calculate the frequency of rare extreme events. Only the
IAEA launched in 2011 a program for the development of complementary safety assessment
methods that avoid the explicit computation of the frequency of events and instead supports the
development of tools for a better qualitative understanding of the strengths and vulnerabilities
of nuclear power plants.
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